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“The essential difference between Free Trade and . . . Protection is, that under a
system of Free Trade the excellence of the product is the only means by which
it can secure a market; while under Protection an inferior article can dominate
the market through the aid of legislation. The necessary effect of Free Trade is,
therefore, to encourage efficiency in production, while the necessary effect of
Protection is to encourage skill in corruption.”
“Prosperity [is] an abundance of commodities. . . . The merit of any policy or
system can be tested by its effect on the volume of commodities available for
the use of the people.” 
—W illiam Bourke Cockran
In the Name of Liberty, 1925ANNUAL REPORT 2002                  F eder al Reserve Bank of Dallas                                                            1
ALETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT
2002 was not the best of years. The
pall of September 11 lasted all year and
beyond. We had to adopt security meas-
ures and change our behavior in ways
that eroded our personal liberty and
economic efficiency. These necessary
changes may not have reduced GDP
much, but they lowered our standard of
living nonetheless. GDP isn’t everything.
The Economy in 2002
Following the 2001 recession, eco-
nomic activity expanded throughout
2002, but not vigorously enough to sus-
tain or promote employment growth.
Increases in output and income were
driven by continued gains in productiv-
ity. Although the unemployment rate never exceeded 6 percent during
the year, the recovery so far has been a jobless one. Productivity gains
may substitute for job growth in the short term when the economy is
weak, but they augur well for a higher standard of living in the long run
when both productivity and job growth are rising.
With aggregate demand too weak to stimulate job growth, monetary
policy in 2002 did not reverse its accommodative stance. In fact, the
FOMC reduced the federal funds rate another half percentage point in
November, bringing the target rate down to 1.25 percent. Inflation
remained subdued, however, with continued disinflation giving rise in
some quarters to concerns about potential deflation.
The Fed and Banking
Banks in the Eleventh Federal Reserve District, like those in the
nation, are generally in good condition. Unlike the aftermath of the
1990–91 recession, there has been no hint of a credit crunch to hinder
economic recovery.
The operations of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas remained on a
sound footing during 2002, although we did experience a slowing in
the volume of checks processed. After years of anticipation, electronic
payments transactions have finally made a dent in paper check vol-
umes, and we are having to adjust our check infrastructure. When the
churn affects our own employees, we have to remind ourselves that a
transition from paper to electronic payments is probably good for the
payments system overall and has been a goal of the Federal Reserve
for many years. Watch out what you ask for. You may get it.The Essay
Our essay this year discusses “The Fruits of Free Trade.” The rhetoric
of the free trade debate has always fascinated me. Sara Evans tells how
her significant other won her over in a song titled “Three Chords and
the Truth.” Economists have known the truth about free trade since
Adam Smith published Wealth of Nations in 1776, but they’ve had
trouble finding the right three chords to resonate with the doubters
and skeptics. They succeed temporarily, but they have to retake old
ground over and over again. The problem is that the benefits of free
trade are widely diffused and often difficult to trace to trade policy,
while the costs of free trade are more concentrated and identifiable.
Perhaps the most eloquent defense of free trade was given by my
hero, Frédéric Bastiat, the French Adam Smith, who used satire as his
chief rhetorical weapon. In his famous petition on behalf of the French
candlemakers, he urged parliament to pass laws requiring the closure
of all blinds and shutters to block out the sun, which competed unfairly
with the candlemakers in the production of light. Another favorite of
mine is an observation attributed to economist Henry George that pro-
tectionists want to do to their own country during peacetime what the
country’s enemies would wish to do to it during wartime—that is, close
its borders to imports.
I must confess to wondering, If such wisdom can’t win the free trade
argument once and for all, what chance do our authors have? What can
they add that is fresh and new? Well, I should know by now not to
underestimate them. Mike Cox and Richard Alm have made a real con-
tribution by following the lead of two of my favorite economists: Yogi
Berra, who said, “You can observe a lot just by watching,” and Richard
Pryor, who famously asked, “Who are you going to believe? Me or your
own lying eyes?” Rather than relying exclusively on arcane arguments,
the authors take us into a supermarket and let us see the fruits (and
nuts) of free trade for ourselves.
Robert D. McTeer, Jr.
President and CEO
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A Personal Footnote on
Texas Picker–Poets
My own 2002 wasn’t all that great.
But focusing on the positives, I had
lunch with Terry Allen, one of my main
honky-tonk heroes, and I made a new
friend—himself a fledgling songwriter—
who introduced me to the blues of Del-
bert McClinton. (“When Rita leaves,
Rita’s gone” is as blue as blue can get.)
On a recent visit to the Buddy Holly
statue in downtown Lubbock, I noticed
that Terry and Delbert had both been
added to the Walk of Fame since I was
last there. 
The world lost Waylon Jennings in
2002, but Billy Joe Shaver is doing fine
after his heart surgery and is getting a
bit more well-deserved national recogni-
tion—thanks in part to a mutual friend.
Alan Damron honored me with an invi-
tation to his first annual Christmas party
in Terlingua, down on the Tex–Mex bor-
der, and even offered to help me with
some cowboy poetry (drugstore style, 
I assume). I couldn’t go, but I’m holding
my calendar open in 2003.
—Bob McTeerAlmost any American supermarket doubles as an international food bazaar.
Alongside potatoes from Idaho and beef from Texas, stores display melons
from Mexico, olive oil from Italy, coffee from Colombia, cinnamon from Sri
Lanka, wine and cheese from France, and bananas from Costa Rica. 
The grocery store isn’t the only place Americans indulge their taste for foreign-
made products. We buy cameras and cars from Japan, shirts from Bangladesh,
videocassette recorders from South Korea, paper products from Canada and
fresh flowers from Ecuador. We get oil from Kuwait, steel from China, com-
puter programs from India and semiconductors from Taiwan. In 2001, U.S.
imports of goods and services totaled $1.6 trillion.
Most Americans are well aware of our penchant for importing, but they
may not realize the United States ranks as the world’s greatest exporter, sell-
ing $1.3 trillion a year to the rest of the world. U.S. companies sell personal
computers, bulldozers, financial services, movies and thousands of other prod-
ucts to just about all parts of the globe.
International trade and investment are facts of everyday life. Over the past
three decades, the sum of U.S. imports and exports increased from 11 percent
of GDP to about 30 percent. International financial transactions have grown
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A Global Fruit Basket
On a trip to the grocery store, consumers
can find goods from all over the globe.rapidly, too. Incoming and outgoing investments rose from less than 1 percent
of total output to more than 3 percent. (See Exhibit 1.)
The United States isn’t alone. The rest of the world has seen a similar surge
in cross-border business. As foreign trade and investment touch communities
from Orléans, France, to New Orleans, Louisiana, they’ve become lightning-rod
issues. One of the great debates of the early 21st century centers on globaliza-
tion, a shorthand term for the intermingling of the world’s economies in an era
of jet travel, instant communications, mass migration and falling trade barriers.
Globalization’s critics attack open markets as a pernicious force that destroys
local industries, breeds poverty and dilutes cultures. Protesters attack the open
trading system Western nations have forged since the end of World War II. Their
favorite targets are often American multinationals, such as McDonald’s.
EXHIBIT 1. A Trading Nation
Over the past three decades, U.S. trade in
goods and services (exports plus imports)
increased from 11 percent to roughly 30 per-
cent of GDP, and capital flows more than
tripled. The economy’s increased openness
helped create 50 million new jobs, and per
capita disposable income nearly doubled. Free














U.S. trade as percentage of GDP
U.S. capital flows as percentage of GDP
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U.S. Trade and Capital Flows
Percent PercentEven as they snap up food, cars and electronic goods from overseas, some
Americans fear that foreign competition is destroying jobs for factory workers,
fishermen and others. They worry, too, that the nation is becoming dependent
on overseas suppliers of oil, computer chips and other inputs.
Attacks on free trade don’t make economic sense. In fact, the critics often
get it backwards. 
We hear that trade makes us poorer. It’s just not so. Trade is the great gen-
erator of economic well-being. It enriches nations because it allows companies
and workers to specialize in doing what they do best. Competition forces them
to become more productive. In the end, consumers reap the bounty of cheaper
and better goods and services.
We hear that trade costs jobs and depresses wages. Again, it’s just not so.
By spurring economic activity and reducing costs, trade helps create jobs. By
enhancing productivity, it keeps U.S. companies vibrant, leading to fatter pay-
checks and added benefits. Workers protected by trade barriers might keep
their jobs a while longer, but the costs in inefficiency and higher prices make
it economic folly. Whenever we erect barriers to trade, we negate the gains
from free exchange and competition. Trade protection degenerates into a neg-
ative-sum game in which special interests jostle for advantage at the expense
of the common good.
We  hear that exports are good because they support U.S. industry but
imports are bad because they steal business from domestic producers. Actu-
ally, imports are the real fruits of trade because the end goal of economic activ-
ity is consumption. Exports represent resources we don’t consume at home.
They are how we pay for what we buy abroad, and we’re better off when we
pay as little as possible. Mercantilism, with its mania for exporting, lost favor
for good reason.
We hear that free trade isn’t fair trade. Cheap imports can hurt higher-cost
U.S. suppliers, but consumers certainly will gain. Why penalize them with tit-
for-tat retaliation that only raises prices in the United States? Other countries’
trade transgressions don’t warrant missteps of our own. A nation will consume
more whenever it opens its markets, even if other nations don’t reciprocate.
We hear that trade makes us dependent on foreign suppliers, but America
doesn’t have the climate and resources to make everything it needs. Other
nations can produce many goods and services at lower cost. The price of inde-
pendence is too steep. 
Americans can’t afford to buy into these trade fallacies. As a society, we
often have to choose between protecting domestic industries and opening
markets. In a weakened economy, steelmakers, catfish farmers and other pro-
ducers are lining up to declare war on imports, creating a potential hit on
Americans’ wallets. At the same time, U.S. negotiators are seeking to expand
the world trading system with new free trade agreements. 
We  need to understand what’s at stake. Being wrongheaded on trade
increases the risk of making bad choices that will sap our economy and sour our
relations with other nations. Getting it right will promote prosperity and peace. 
ANNUAL REPORT 2002                  F eder al Reserve Bank of Dallas                                                            5The Secret to Wealth
When the ancient Greeks faced a dilemma, they consulted the Oracle at
Delphi. If we were to ask the Oracle the secret to wealth, what would she say?
Work hard? Get an education? Probably not. Diligence and intelligence are
strategies for improving one’s lot in life, but plenty of smart, hard-working peo-
ple remain poor.
No, the Oracle’s advice would consist of just a few words: Do what you do
best. Trade for the rest. In other words, specialize and then trade. 
The farmer grows wheat, the baker makes bread, the weaver produces
cloth, the tailor sews clothing, the lumberjack harvests wood, the carpenter
builds houses. By exchanging the fruits of their labor in the marketplace, they
all can enjoy more food, clothing and shelter than they could if each tried to
meet his needs in isolation.
Magnified many times, that is our world. Americans live and work in a
highly interdependent society where jobs are specialized and a typical house-
hold buys goods and services from thousands of sources, not just in this coun-
try but around the globe. We’ve embraced specialization and trade, and the
reward lies in a standard of living that’s the envy of the world.
Whether trade involves the dry cleaner down the street or the carpet
maker on the far side of the planet, all involved in the transaction end up
better off. Why? Because trade is voluntary. No one would accept a raw deal
of his own free will.
If there’s a secret to wealth, it lies in the alchemy of specialization and
trade. Buyer and seller consume more without added effort. It sounds too
good to be true. Yet unlike the alchemist’s false promise of turning lead into
gold, the gains from specialization and trade occur wherever markets are
allowed to function.
It’s a matter of working smarter, not harder.
Societies reaped the benefits of specialization and trade for thousands of
years before English economist David Ricardo (1772–1823) finally demon-
strated why it works. His theory of comparative advantage helps explain why
the United States exports soybeans to China and imports shoes in return.
Suppose an average American worker can produce 100 bushels of soybeans
or five pairs of shoes and a typical Chinese worker can turn out eight bushels
of soybeans or four pairs of shoes.
The United States is more productive than China in both industries, but con-
sumers in both countries can still gain from specialization and trade. Shifting
a U.S. worker from shoe factory to soybean farm produces a gain of 100
bushels of soybeans at the cost of five pairs of shoes. Shifting two Chinese
workers from farm to factory raises shoe output by eight pairs but cuts soy-
bean production by 16 bushels. The net effect is an increase of 84 bushels of
soybeans and three pairs of shoes. 
Total output of both products reaches a maximum when the United States
specializes in soybeans and China in shoes. Through trade, the two countries
6 Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas ANNUAL REPORT 2002can divide the added production between themselves, leaving both better off
than they were on their own. (See Exhibit 2.)
In the real world, trade isn’t a two-party swap meet. The United States
does business with more than 225 other nations—from Albania to Zim-
babwe. The dizzying number of potential transactions increases the opportu-
nities to gain from trade.
This potent international division of labor enables America to take advantage
of its expertise in such industries as jet-aircraft manufacturing and financial serv-
ices while other countries exploit their edge in oil production or hand assembly.
Specialization and trade arise out of the profit motive. Except when trans-
action costs are too high or governments impose barriers, buyers and sellers
will find each other. We’re not meant to go it alone.
Self-sufficiency may sound noble in the abstract, but it condemns people to
meager living standards. History shows us as much. The American pioneers,
living on remote homesteads and ranches, had no choice but to produce just
about everything on their own. They embodied the virtue of self-reliance; yet
ANNUAL REPORT 2002                  F eder al Reserve Bank of Dallas                                                            7
EXHIBIT 2. The Alchemy of Exchange
Five hundred Chinese workers can each produce four pairs of shoes or eight bushels of soybeans. One hundred U.S. workers can each
produce five pairs or 100 bushels—more productive in both jobs but comparatively more so in farming. Under an autarkic regime—
isolated from foreign trade—Chinese workers can afford one pair of shoes each and six bushels of soybeans; Americans, three and 40.
Trading freely, China will specialize in shoes and America in soybeans, raising world production of shoes from 800 to 2,000 pairs and
soybeans from 7,000 to 10,000 bushels. Chinese workers can then afford three pairs of shoes and 10 bushels of soybeans; American
workers, five and 50.
Autarky Free Trade
China U.S. China U.S.
Labor Force 500 100 500 100
Output per worker
Shoes 45 45
Soybeans 81 0 0 81 0 0
Employment
Shoes 125 60 500 0
Soybeans 375 40 0 100
Production
Shoes 500 300 2,000 0
Soybeans 3,000 4,000 0 10,000
Consumption
Shoes 500 300 1,500 500
Soybeans 3,000 4,000 5,000 5,000
Consumption per person
Shoes 13 35
Soybeans 64 0 1 0 5 0they worked from sunup to sundown, seven days a week to eke out a subsis-
tence living. (See Exhibit 3.)
A jack of all trades will never be rich. Because specialization and trade create
wealth, independence becomes a fool’s errand—for countries as well as individuals. 
The United States could grow its own bananas, but it would take a huge cap-
ital investment to reproduce the tropics’ growing conditions. Using mammoth
glass-domed greenhouses, artificial lighting and sprinklers, we could probably
achieve banana self-reliance. Our bananas, of course, would be the world’s
most expensive. It’s absurd in economic terms.
The Extent of the Market
There are no valets in the country-
side. You won’t even find a taxi.
That’s because “the division of labor
is limited by the extent of the mar-
ket,” as Adam Smith noted some
225 years ago. Only in cities is spe-
cialization great enough that some-
one can drive or park cars for a living.
Plotting a regression line for more
than 3,000 U.S. counties shows that
per capita income tends to rise with
population density. New York (not
shown) is the most densely popu-
lated county (66,940 people per
square mile) and has the greatest per
capita income ($93,999). Loup
County, Nebraska, among the spars-
est populated (1.2 people per
square mile), has the lowest per
capita income ($6,831).
EXHIBIT 3. Independently Poor
Imagine the living standard each of us
would have if we consumed only the
goods and services we could produce.
Few of us can make our own clothing,
build our own house or even grow
enough food to survive. At best, our
self-sufficient living standard would
reach that of the pioneers, who toiled
long hours but remained dirt poor. As
Adam Smith, the father of modern
economics, revealed in Wealth of
Nations, the keys to wealth are spe-
cialization and trade, not just work.

































Per Capita Income Rises with Population Density
People per square mile (log scale)
Income
Nebraska pioneer family, 1886No one advocates banana independence, but energy is another matter. With
this nation growing more dependent on foreign oil and with the increasing
potential for disruption in international oil markets, isolationists want America
to quench its own thirst for gasoline. As with bananas, the United States could
achieve oil self-sufficiency—if consumers were willing to pay the price.
Over the past two decades, America’s demand for oil has risen steadily. At the
same time, the nation’s ability to extract energy at competitive prices has waned.
We now import 61 percent of our oil, so doing without foreign suppliers would
require much higher prices to boost production and reduce consumption.
Domestic oil prices would have to jump to about $145 a barrel to increase
output 7.5 percent, to 3.7 billion barrels a year. We’d still have to get by on 60
percent less oil, so pump prices would triple, to at least $7.50 a gallon. Energy
independence would condemn consumers to sharply lower living standards
and raise costs to just about every U.S. industry. Overall, GDP would fall 6.7
percent. (See Exhibit 4.) 
Oil isn’t any different from other goods and services. We’re much better off
importing oil from nations that produce it at a lower cost. We pay for it by sell-
ing our goods and services to oil suppliers in other countries.
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America has been a net importer of oil since the late 1940s. Today, nearly two-thirds (61 percent) of our oil comes from abroad.
Some say this situation makes the nation vulnerable and we should seek energy independence. But what would it cost? Economists
put price elasticity at about 0.04 for U.S. oil production and –0.5 for domestic oil demand. This means that a roughly 500 percent
increase in oil prices would be needed to equate domestic supply and demand over a 10-year period. U.S. motorists would pay close
to $7.50 for a gallon of gasoline and have to drive nearly 60 percent less. Prices for plastics and other oil derivatives would rise
sharply, and we’d have to consume less of these products as well. All told, the nation would suffer an $80 billion annual loss in GDP,
which would grow over time as we depleted our limited oil reserves. We’d be independent—and poor.
Domestic Crude Oil Production and Consumption
Billion barrels per yearConsuming Interest
Since the days of Adam Smith, economists have preached that competition
is the consumer’s best friend. The principle doesn’t change with the national-
ity of the suppliers. Imports enrich the marketplace by adding to the variety of
goods and services. Sometimes, foreign products offer higher quality, better
design or added features. Often, imports are cheaper. 
Imagine the American consumer without foreign goods and services. Car
buyers couldn’t drive off the lot in eight of the 10 highest-rated vehicles. Brides’
fingers would no longer sparkle with the best diamonds from Africa. Restau-
rants couldn’t serve real margaritas because Mexico makes the only genuine
tequila. There’d be no titanium to forge the high-tech clubs that help golfers hit
monster tee shots. We’d have no Swiss chocolate or German cutlery.
The United States imports nuts from 67 different countries. Italy sends us
almonds. We get cashews from India, pistachios from Turkey and Brazil nuts from
Bolivia. Variety is the spice of life, and we’d lose some of it without imports: cloves
from Madagascar, nutmeg from Guatemala, pepper from India.
In millions of everyday decisions, American shoppers show they’re quite
aware of the value of imports. Just look at what we’re buying from one coun-
try—China. The Asian giant has become one of the United States’ leading sup-
The World in a Can
In the average can of mixed nuts, you might find almonds from Italy, walnuts from China, Brazil nuts from Bolivia, cashews from India,
pistachios from Turkey, hazelnuts from Canada—a true international assortment. Imports add spice to life by offering consumers a
nearly limitless array of choices.
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You don’t have to shop at Pier 1 Imports to see “Made in China.” A trip to just about any major U.S. retailer—Wal-Mart, Best Buy,
Toys“R”Us, Banana Republic—will turn up troves of Chinese imports that we enjoy in everyday life. We get 88 percent of our imported
radios from China, 83 percent of our imported toys, 70 percent of leather goods and 67 percent of shoes. In 2002, the United States
imported more than $8 billion in sneakers and other shoes from China, $6 billion in toys and $3 billion in VCRs. It adds up to 11 percent
of overall U.S. imports, up from just 0.5 percent in 1980. What would we do without China? Pay more and have less, that’s for sure.
pliers of toys, leather goods, power tools, shoes and electronics. Americans
bought $123 billion in products from China in 2002. (See Exhibit 5.)
If imports only added variety and quality to the marketplace, they’d be a
boon to consumers. But foreign goods also help keep a lid on prices. They do
it in two ways—by being cheaper themselves and by encouraging U.S. com-
petitors to lower their prices.
Over the past five years, U.S. prices have actually fallen for a wide range of
traded goods, such as computers, clothing, toys and photographic supplies.
Most television sets now come from overseas, and their prices are down nearly
10 percent in the past five years. Americans pay 15 percent less for other video
equipment and more than 25 percent less for computers and peripherals.
At the same time, inflation hit hardest at goods and services that face little
or no foreign competition, such as college tuition, medical services and cable
television service. (See Exhibit 6 on the next page.)
Above all else, trade is a pocketbook issue. Consumers’ well-being, not cor-
porate profit, is the true measure of an economy’s success. When producers
from all over the world vie with our homegrown companies for Americans’
dollars, our consumers win.
ANNUAL REPORT 2002                  F eder al Reserve Bank of Dallas                                                            11












1.4 Sweaters and pullovers
Top imports (percentage of all imports)
88 Radios





65 Lamps and lights
64 Cases for cameras, eyeglasses, etc.




Stocking Up on Chinese GoodsEXHIBIT 6. Wanted: More Cheap Imports
Trade fosters competition, which rewards productivity and restrains cost. That’s why products that cross borders tend to have lower infla-
tion rates than ones that don’t. Between 1997 and 2002, prices fell for a whole array of highly traded goods—TV sets, toys, dishes, cloth-
ing, cars, rice and more—while rising for largely nontraded ones—sugar, peanut butter, haircuts, rent, prescription drugs, hospital services
and the like. Free trade is the consumer’s best friend.









Men's shirts and sweaters








Sugar and artificial sweeteners
Peanut butter
Garbage and trash collection
Full-service meals and snacks
Haircuts and other personal care services
Motor vehicle repair
Rent of primary residence
Funeral expenses
Dental services
Admission to movies, theaters, concerts
Prescription drugs and medical supplies
College tuition and fees
Cable television
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Five-year price change (percent)Nations open to the world economy prosper, while those that hide behind
trade barriers do not. Consider China. Once a leading economic power, China
closed itself off from the rest of the world in the 15th century. The result was
hundreds of years of economic decline, only now being reversed by more
open policies. Research comparing nations’ economic freedom with their eco-
nomic performance finds that citizens of countries ranking in the top fifth in
economic freedom consume almost twice as much per capita as those living
in the next lower 20 percent. They’re eight to nine times better off than resi-
dents of the least free nations. (See Exhibit 7.)
Not surprisingly, the United States and other capitalist nations rank high in
both per capita consumption and economic freedom. For the most part, U.S.
tariffs are low, averaging just 1.7 percent of the value of imports. What tariffs
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EXHIBIT 7. Free to Consume
People who live in free countries enjoy sub-
stantially higher living standards than those
living in repressive countries. The World
Bank collects data on per capita consump-
tion by country. Two independent research
groups—the Heritage Foundation in Wash-
ington, D.C., and the Fraser Institute in
Canada—measure economic freedom
across the world using a broad variety of cri-
teria based on key components of free
enterprise, including trade policies and
openness to foreign investment. Relating
the consumption and freedom data sets,
one finds that per capita consumption in the
economically freest fifth of countries is eight
















In North Korea, which ranks lowest in economic freedom, con-
sumers must wrangle for the most basic items, even food. Per
capita income averages just $950 annually.
South Koreans enjoy the bounty of a capitalist-oriented,
economically free society. Per capita income is $11,428—
12 times that of North Korea.
Economic Freedom and Consumption
Per capita consumption
A Tale of Two Countrieswe do impose impact only a few industries, such as agriculture, textiles and
apparel. (See Exhibit 8.)
The poorest consumers live in countries ranked as the most closed to the
outside world, including Cuba, Zimbabwe, Laos, Libya and Belarus. Commu-
nist North Korea sits at rock bottom in terms of economic freedom, and its
standard of living pales in comparison with that of capitalist South Korea, a
much more open country with similar cultural roots.
Competition makes nations stronger. Protectionism condemns them to
weakness. Countries that hide behind barriers don’t perform as well as free
traders. Switzerland’s International Institute for Management Development
generates an annual index of competitiveness, based on hundreds of factors
that reflect economic strength. A strong correlation exists between the most
competitive nations and countries that rank high on measures of economic
openness. Closed economies, of course, are among the least competitive. 
Liberal trade policies aren’t a panacea, of course. Like Argentina, countries
can continue to struggle after opening their markets to foreign competition.
They fail to understand that free trade works when nations integrate it with
other key tenets of capitalism, such as respect for property rights, free labor
markets and less government regulation.
Competition from abroad can dislocate some workers, sap some company
profits and roil some markets. So do new products, new technologies and new
business strategies. We’ve learned to endure—even celebrate—the home-
grown forces of economic change as essential elements of economic progress.
We should do the same for international trade and investment. 
EXHIBIT 8. The Tax on Trade
Reduced tariff rates lowered trade barriers and helped stimulate economic growth in recent decades. A growing number of nontariff
barriers, however, threaten to undo the good. Voluntary export restraints; antidumping laws; government subsidies; licensing, label-
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Nontariff Barriers: The New Enemies of Trade
  1. Import quotas
  2. Voluntary export restraints
  3. Antidumping laws
  4. Exchange-rate controls
  5. Countervailing duties
  6. Government subsidies
  7. Licensing, labeling and packaging restrictions
  8. Quality controls and technical standards
  9. Domestic-content laws
10. Political rhetoric
11. Embargoes and sanctions
12. Most/least-favored nation status
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Percent
Ratio of Duties to ImportsProducers Versus Consumers
Although trade protection makes no economic sense, just about every nation
on earth indulges in it to some degree. To understand why, we need to distinguish
the general interest, which favors freer trade, from special interests, which profit
at the expense of the overall economy—a negative-sum game. (See Exhibit 9.)
This tug-of-war pits producers against consumers. Producers want scarcity—
high prices and fat profits. Consumers want abundance—many goods and serv-
ices at low prices.
Although consumers outnumber producers, those who seek protection
often gain an upper hand. That’s because producers are willing to invest more
resources in reducing competition than consumers are in fighting for open
markets. The imbalance is inherent in the economic system.
Consumers buy in thousands of markets. No individual possesses the time,
energy and financial incentive to fight for lower prices in each of them. The over-
all gains from open trade may be large, but each household’s share is usually a
few dollars or even a few cents—an amount too small to fire up consumers.
Producers, on the other hand, sell in one market. It gives them a strong
incentive to focus on their own industry or jobs. Producers, unlike consumers,
are usually few in number. Even if curtailing foreign competition adds only a
few pennies per sale, each producer stands to reap a nice profit.
So producers are willing to organize and spend big money in the fight for
government favor. We see it in the growing number of lawyers and lobbyists
who represent producers’ narrow interests. In the past quarter century, the
number of registered lobbyists in Washington tripled, to over 60,000. There
are 44,000 more lobbyists at the state level.
The imbalance between producers and consumers shows up in America’s
long-standing import quotas on sugar. Because of inflated prices, a small
number of growers and refiners pocket an estimated $400 million a year. The
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By offering trade protection, lawmakers create a dilemma for pro-
ducers: Compete or seek protection. The economic pie is never
greater than when firms compete because then they focus every
resource on production. But suppose firm A can increase its piece of
the pie (say, from 50 to 60 out of 100) by promising votes or cam-
paign contributions in return for political favors. Then its incentive is
to do so even though the total pie will shrink (say, to 90) as resources
shift from production to protection. Its competitor, firm B, will do like-
wise, with similar results. The politics of protectionism lead ultimately
to the worst possible outcome: a negative-sum game in which less is
produced than under free trade. The only way out of this mess:
Nobody gets protection.
































shrinks the piequotas deny consumers cheaper foreign-made sugar, so they’re worse off. The
overall cost to a typical household, however, totals just $21 a year, hardly
enough to incite anyone to petition, picket or politic.
Each instance of protection might involve small amounts of money. Add them
up, though, and consumers are left significantly poorer. The Institute for Interna-
tional Economics estimates the annual cost of U.S. foreign protectionism at
$6,027 per household.
Special interests are difficult to police because they’re a natural byproduct
of our economic success. They derive from specialization, the concentration of
producers’ efforts to do what they do best. So the major force undermining
open trade arises from the very thing that creates wealth in the first place.
Protectionism persists because it’s never pitched as a conspiracy to raise con-
sumer prices. Instead, it’s presented as a worthy idea. Who could object to saving
American jobs or ensuring the survival of industries vital to the national interest?
Troubled industries with political clout—automobiles, steel and agriculture,
for example—blame competition from imports for lost jobs and declining
sales. It makes for the perfect bumper sticker: Buy American. The Job You Save
May Be Your Own. 
Producers complicate the trade debate by putting the onus on other countries.
The offenses of foreign governments include subsidizing textile manufacturers
and farmers. Often, American industries charge that foreign companies dump
their products on the U.S. market at unfairly low prices. (See Exhibit 10.)
So-called unfair trade practices provide a justification for breaching the common
sense of free trade. We should, however, ask, Unfair to whom? Subsidies are surely
unfair to European taxpayers. Dumping might seem unfair to U.S. producers. Neither
is particularly unfair to American consumers, who benefit from the lower prices.
When other countries’ trade negotiators fight U.S. dumping complaints,
they’re standing up for their nations’ companies. Without intending to, they’re
also working for American consumers.
Another trade complaint centers on nations where workers earn just $1 or
$2 a day. Protectionists claim that cheap foreign labor drives down domestic
wages and hurts U.S. industry. That’s not how economies work. American
workers command high wages because of their skills, education and produc-
tivity. They’ll still be well paid even if American consumers take advantage of
the bargains trade offers.
Indeed, trade correlates with higher wages. Workers in Mexico’s maquiladoras—
which assemble products for export—earn more than those in similar jobs in
domestic industries. U.S. workers in export industries command an 18 percent pre-
mium. In general, export-oriented firms are more productive, and they pay better.
Governments often succumb to the lure of temporary trade barriers. Poor
countries, for example, may restrict imports to give infant domestic industries
a chance to take root. Such strategies trust bureaucrats to pick winners. If
they’re wrong, it simply wastes money. And if they’re right, the outcome is
even worse: Industries become addicted to protection, so they marshal their
political clout to preserve it long after it may have served its purpose.
Buy American. The Job You Save May Be
Your Own.
A common myth is that it’s better for
Americans to spend their money at home
than abroad. The best way to expose the
fallacy in this argument is to take it to its
logical  extreme.  If  it’s better for me to
spend my money here than abroad, then
it’s even better to buy in Texas than in
New York, better yet to buy in Dallas than
in Houston. . .in my own neighborhood
. . .within my own family. . .to consume
only what I can produce. Alone and poor.
16 Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas ANNUAL REPORT 2002ANNUAL REPORT 2002                  F eder al Reserve Bank of Dallas                                                            17
Dumping is a word normally associated with refuse. But dumped goods can be a boon to consumers. Over the past two decades,
U.S. producers have filed more than 300 antidumping claims against foreign suppliers. The allegedly offensive products run the gamut
from tin cans to toothbrushes, aspirin to alcohol, hammers to honey, pencils to pasta. Trash or treasure? The consumer surely knows.
EXHIBIT 10. Dumping: Trash or Treasure?






Nonfrozen apple juice concentrate
Frozen concentrated orange juice
Canned pineapple












Polyethylene terephthalate film (used in
soda containers)
Greige polyester cotton print cloth (dish
towels)
Polychloroprene rubber (latex gloves)
Tin mill products (battery tops)
Potassium permanganate (disinfectant)
Alloy magnesium (aluminum cans)
Anhydrous sodium metasilicate (dish-
washing soap)
Sebacic acid (toothbrush bristles)
Sulfanilic acid (food coloring)






Melamine (plastic cart handle)
Ball bearings (cart wheels)
On the shopper
Synthetic indigo (purple-dyed sweater)
Polyester staple fiber (skirt) 








Carbon steel wire rods
Stainless steel bars
Steel concrete reinforcing bars
Structural steel beams
Welded carbon steel pipe









Foundry coke (used in the production of
engine blocks)
Polychloroprene rubber (belts and hoses)
Alloy magnesium (auto body)
Industrial nitrocellulose (paint)
Where are the dumped goods?Protection’s Price
Although specialization and trade make us wealthier, most societies spend
a lot of time, money and energy trying to thwart the exchange of goods and
services. At home, companies pursuing their self-interest often breed monop-
olies that restrict supply and hike prices. The same impulse to stifle competi-
tion leads to a variety of trade measures aimed at imports.
As the United States reduced tariffs over the past six decades, producers
turned to import quotas, antidumping penalties, domestic-content laws, “vol-
untary” export restraints and other nontariff barriers. Export subsidies,
exchange-rate controls, trade licenses, and onerous labeling, packaging and
technical requirements further tilt the market against foreign goods.
In whatever guise, protectionism is pure poison for an economy. Time and
again, economic studies show that import restraints aren’t worth it. They sad-
dle consumers with huge costs. Dozens of researchers have reached this con-
clusion for a host of products, from steel, automobiles and semiconductors to
textiles, apparel and farm products.
Even when they temporarily stave off job losses, trade barriers are costly.
For example, trade protection saved 216 U.S. jobs in the production of ben-
zenoid chemicals, used in suntan lotion and other products—but at a cost of
nearly $1.4 million per worker. Because the chemical workers earn a fraction
of the protectionist toll, it would cost far less to simply pay them not to work!
In case after case, the costs of protection outweigh the benefits. The tab for
each job preserved in the luggage industry is nearly $1.3 million; in softwood lum-
ber, more than $1 million; in sugar, more than $826,000. Moreover, some of the
jobs saved are dirty, dangerous and low paying. (See Exhibit 11.)
And trade barriers don’t deliver on their promise to save beleaguered indus-
tries. Even when shielded from foreign competition, most protected sectors
have continued to shrink. Steel and textiles—beneficiaries of years of protec-
tion—are still not strong enough to compete on their own.
The U.S. automobile industry provides a good illustration of the economic
forces unleashed by trade protection. Under pressure from automakers and
unions, Washington coaxed Japan into accepting “voluntary” limits in the
1980s on the number of cars it would sell in the United States. 
Protectionism didn’t spark the renaissance the U.S. auto industry wanted.
Asian and European automakers kept coming, lured by American consumers’
craving for cars. The companies adapted their strategies for penetrating the
U.S. market; they moved production to plants in the United States and shifted
their focus to high-quality, luxury vehicles. 
As a result, foreign producers captured a larger share of the high-priced,
high-profit segment of the car market. In the 1990s, the average prices of
imported and domestic models were relatively close. In 2001, the imports sold
for nearly 40 percent more, on average, than U.S.-made cars. Even with pro-
tection, Detroit couldn’t hang onto this lucrative slice of the market. Domestic
(Continued on page 21)
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EXHIBIT 11. The High Cost of Protectionism
How much does it cost to protect a job? An average of $231,289, figured across just 20 of the many protected industries. Costs
range from $132,870 per job saved in the costume jewelry business to $1,376,435 in the benzenoid chemical industry. Protection-
ism costs U.S. consumers nearly $100 billion annually. It increases not just the cost of the protected items but downstream products
as well. Protecting sugar raises candy and soft drink prices; protecting lumber raises home-building costs; protecting steel makes car
prices higher; and so forth. Then there are the job losses in downstream industries. Workers in steel-using industries outnumber those
in steel-producing industries by 57 to 1. And the protection doesn't even work. Subsidies to steel-producing industries since 1975
have exceeded $23 billion; yet industry employment has declined by nearly two-thirds.
Total cost Annual cost
Protected industry Jobs saved (in millions) per job saved
1 Benzenoid chemicals 216  $     297  $ 1,376,435
2 Luggage 226 290  1,285,078
3 Softwood lumber 605  632  1,044,271
4 Sugar 2,261 1,868 826,104
5 Polyethylene resins 298  242  812,928
6 Dairy products 2,378 1,630 685,323
7 Frozen concentrated orange juice 609  387  635,103
8 Ball bearings 146  88  603,368
9 Maritime services 4,411 2,522 571,668
10 Ceramic tiles 347  191  551,367
11 Machine tools 1,556 746  479,452
12 Ceramic articles 418  140  335,876
13 Women's handbags 773  204  263,535
14 Canned tuna 390  100  257,640
15 Glassware 1,477 366 247,889
16 Apparel and textiles  168,786 33,629 199,241
17 Peanuts 397 74  187,223
18 Rubber footwear 1,701 286  168,312
19 Women's nonathletic footwear 3,702 518  139,800
20 Costume jewelry 1,067 142  132,870
Total 191,764 $44,352
Average (weighted) $   231,289EXHIBIT 12. Any Which Way It Can
There are 768 million motor vehicles in oper-
ation around the globe. Nearly 200 auto com-
panies run 741 assembly plants in 508 cities
and 59 countries, producing thousands of dif-
ferent vehicles for consumers in more than
150 countries. Ford Motor Co. produces cars
in 17 countries—nearly three-fourths of its
production now occurs outside the United
States. General Motors Corp. exports more
cars from Germany than does BMW. Half of all
Toyotas and three-fourths of all Hondas sold in
America are built here. The 2001 Honda Civic
coupe is 75 percent domestic content; the
Ford Escort, 60 percent.
What’s the message in all this? A highly
globalized and competitive auto industry gets
vehicles to consumers any which way it can.
That’s how markets work.
Protection only thwarts the process, and it
can’t deliver what it promises to workers or
industry anyway. A prime example is the “vol-
untary” export restraint imposed on Japanese
automakers in 1981. At the time of the protec-
tionist legislation, foreign-based imports were
26 percent of U.S. auto sales and domestically
made foreign cars were just 2 percent. Imports
made up 23 percent of the nation’s luxury car
market; the average import sold for $8,896—
slightly less than a U.S.-made car ($8,912).
There were 1.9 million workers in the U.S.
transportation equipment industry. 
In 2001, 23 percent of U.S. sales were
imports, but 26 percent were foreign cars built
in this country. Imports comprised 58 percent
of the U.S. luxury market; the average import
sold for $27,477, nearly 40 percent more than
a domestically made car ($19,654). Since
1981 the U.S. transportation equipment indus-
try has lost more than 210,000 workers. More-
over, according to Consumer Reports, foreign-
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contentautomakers’ market share and employment continued to slide in the 1990s,
although new jobs were created in the foreign-owned factories. (See Exhibit 12.)
Protectionism fails domestic industries because it delays and weakens their
response to market forces. Particularly when in trouble, companies need to
confront reality and avoid wasting precious time and resources. Sometimes,
that reality demands that jobs be cut, companies shut down and even whole
industries wither. When industries pursue political favors instead of efficiency
or innovation, they only delay the inevitable.
Responding to market signals, vibrant economies shift resources from
declining sectors to emerging ones. Trade barriers short-circuit the process by
muting the market’s message. Labor and capital that could be more produc-
tive elsewhere end up stuck in industries where cheaper or better import alter-
natives are readily available.
When steel companies or sugar producers want to fend off imports, they
complain to Washington. A second but far less visible free trade contest takes
place in state capitals, where the makers of some goods and services seek to
restrict out-of-state rivals. 
The U.S. Constitution’s commerce clause
creates a hurdle for state and local interfer-
ence with the flow of goods and services.
Although it’s more difficult to impose trade
barriers within U.S. borders than without,
producers still try. To skirt the commerce
clause, they often cloak homegrown trade
protection in the guise of promoting con-
sumer protection or public safety.
An 87-year-old Oklahoma law, for example, decrees that only licensed
funeral directors can sell caskets—a policy that discourages consumers from
shopping around and keeps prices high. Vermont restricts its milk market to
in-state dairies. Internet commerce creates a new avenue for state meddling;
for example, Texas prohibits the online sale of used cars, and Georgia restricts
commerce in replacement contact lenses.
Domestic trade barriers hurt consumers just as much as those aimed at
foreigners. The Fraser Institute finds that government intervention costs resi-
dents of West Virginia—the least open state—$5,294 annually, weighted
against a national average of $26,765 in per capita personal income. In con-
trast, Delaware’s citizens gain an average of $3,882 a year by living in the
state with the lowest barriers. A per capita gap of $9,176, or 34 percent of per
capita disposable income, shows just how much even interstate trade issues
matter.
The Great Depression provides an example of how trade restrictions lead
to economic ruin. America’s highly restrictive Smoot–Hawley tariff, passed
in 1930, prompted other countries to retaliate by imposing their own trade
barriers. Under the weight of the restrictions, world trade contracted
sharply over the next few years, compounding excess capacity problems. At
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Commerce Clause
The Congress shall have power
to…regulate commerce with
foreign nations, and among the
several states, and with the
Indian tribes.
—U.S. Constitutionthe Depression’s depths, about a quarter of U.S. workers were unemployed.
(See Exhibit 13.) 
Whether aimed at foreigners or fellow Americans, trade restraints aren’t
just a matter of lost dollars and cents. All protectionist schemes violate basic
economic freedoms. They involve third parties using the power of government
to thwart the right of others seeking an exchange that will make them better off.
Each time it happens, Americans are less free—and poorer.
EXHIBIT 13. Protect and Destroy: The Lesson of Smoot–Hawley
The stock market hates protectionism. That lesson—perhaps the clearest his-
tory has ever taught—comes from the Smoot–Hawley Tariff Act of 1930. In the
late 1920s farmers, whose economic fortunes had not kept pace with industri-
alists’, lobbied Congress for tariffs on agricultural products. The proposed act
had few political sponsors at first (two of the three major political parties
opposed it), and the stock market ignored it. 
But as word of the bill spread, more and more U.S. producers joined the
bandwagon, arguing for tariffs to assist domestic industry or protect them from
foreign competition. Smoot–Hawley eventually expanded to cover more than
20,000 items across the gamut of U.S. production, with rates practically pro-
hibitive to trade. With so many political constituents now on board, the Pro-
gressive and Democratic parties jumped the fence and on October 28, 1929,
joined the Old Guard Republicans in supporting the legislation. That day the
stock market crashed, falling 12 percent. 
In the months that followed, foreign governments filed 34 formal protests, and
1,028 economists petitioned President Hoover not to sign the bill. But he did, on June
17, 1930, and the Great Depression engulfed the nation. The Dow Jones Industrial
Average fell from a daily high of 381 in September 1929 to a low of 41 in 1932 as
world trade contracted from $5.7 billion to just $1.9 billion three and a half years later. 
It was the most expensive lesson markets have ever taught: Protect and destroy.
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World trade












Dow Jones Falls as World Trade Contracts
Millions of nominal dollars IndexProsperity or Poison?
The 1930s taught a painful lesson—one that for the most part has been
heeded. Despite lapses into protectionism, freer trade has been a theme of
both Democratic and Republican administrations since Truman. Under Amer-
ican leadership, a half-dozen rounds of global negotiations stripped away trade
barriers and, in 1995, created the World Trade Organization, a 144-nation
forum for opening markets. 
We’ve enlarged our market by entering into an economic alliance with
Canada and Mexico under the nine-year-old North American Free Trade Agree-
ment. Policymakers are opening free trade talks with five Central American
nations in an effort to forge a hemispheric free trade zone stretching from
Alaska to Tierra del Fuego.
Consumers aren’t getting the benefits of trade at the expense of the overall
economy. Between 1980 and 2001, world trade more than tripled, to $12.5
trillion. At the same time, the U.S. economy doubled and the Dow Jones Indus-
trial Average rose ninefold, even after taking into account the past three years’
declines. (See Exhibit 14.)
Was our expanding trade bad for workers? Hardly. The United States has
added 35 million jobs in the past two decades. Despite a sluggish economy,
unemployment is still lower than it was in 1980. Our wages buy more. The
past two decades disprove the idea that trade saps America’s economy. 
ANNUAL REPORT 2002                  F eder al Reserve Bank of Dallas                                                            23
The passage of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the North American Free Trade Agreement and GATT’s successor, the
World Trade Organization, ushered in an era of freer trade that’s been applauded by stock markets worldwide. Smoot–Hawley taught
us trade’s lesson the hard way—protect and destroy. Today, we’re relearning it the right way—compete and prosper.
EXHIBIT 14. Compete and Prosper: The Lesson of NAFTA and GATT
World trade
















Dow Jones Rises as World Trade Expands
Billions of nominal dollars IndexThe lesson of the marketplace hasn’t been lost on Europe. By fits and starts,
the continent has moved over the past five decades to create a single market,
reducing barriers to the movement of goods, money and people. At the start
of 2002, a dozen European nations embraced a single currency. 
Last December, the European Union invited 10 additional countries to join
by 2004, laying the foundation for what could become a 25-nation market of
475 million consumers. Existing EU nations are well-off. The countries joining
the enlarged market realize they’ll face new competition, but they’re eager to
open their economies so they can heed the Oracle’s wisdom:
Do what you do best.
Trade for the rest.
Like Estonians, Czechs and other potential EU members, Americans have a
large stake in a free trade future—internationally, of course, but at home as
well. If we open markets, specialization and trade will work their magic for
American consumers, just as they have for most of our history.
American consumers will get better goods and services and lower prices.
American companies will thrive in the crucible of global competition. Our
economy will flourish and innovate. 
Trade leads to prosperity. Just look at the past six decades of relatively open
trade. Protectionism leads to stagnation and decline. It’s a lesson learned
decades ago from the Great Depression and more recently from the economic
development gap between open West Germany and closed East Germany.
Despite the World Trade Organization, NAFTA and other advances, trade pol-
icy continues to be a contest between free trade advocates and protectionist
forces, between consumers’ broad interest in abundance and producers’ narrow
interest in scarcity. The producers will win if Main Street Americans don’t com-
prehend their stake in open trade and aren’t vigilant against protectionist poison. 
Do we harvest the fruits of free trade or suffer the spoils of special interests?
It’s our choice.
—W. Michael Cox and Richard Alm
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MANAGEMENT’S ASSERTION
February 13, 2003
To the Board of Directors of the
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas:
The management of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas (FRBD) is responsible for the preparation and
fair presentation of the Statement of Financial Condition, Statement of Income, and Statement of
Changes in Capital as of December 31, 2002 (the “Financial Statements”). The Financial Statements
have been prepared in conformity with the accounting principles, policies, and practices established 
by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and as set forth in the Financial Accounting
Manual for the Federal Reserve Banks (“Manual”), and as such, include amounts, some of which are
based on judgments and estimates of management. To our knowledge, the Financial Statements are,
in all material respects, fairly presented in conformity with the accounting principles, policies, and prac-
tices documented in the Manual and include all disclosures necessary for such fair presentation.
The management of the FRBD is responsible for maintaining an effective process of internal controls
over financial reporting including the safeguarding of assets as they relate to the Financial Statements.
Such internal controls are designed to provide reasonable assurance to management and to the Board
of Directors regarding the preparation of reliable Financial Statements. This process of internal controls
contains self-monitoring mechanisms, including, but not limited to, divisions of responsibility and a
code of conduct. Once identified, any material deficiencies in the process of internal controls are
reported to management, and appropriate corrective measures are implemented.
Even an effective process of internal controls, no matter how well designed, has inherent limitations,
including the possibility of human error, and therefore can provide only reasonable assurance with
respect to the preparation of reliable financial statements.
The management of the FRBD assessed its process of internal controls over financial reporting includ-
ing the safeguarding of assets reflected in the Financial Statements, based upon the criteria established
in the “Internal Control–Integrated Framework” issued by the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations
of the Treadway Commission (COSO). Based on this assessment, we believe that the FRBD maintained
an effective process of internal controls over financial reporting including the safeguarding of assets as
they relate to the Financial Statements.
President First Vice President
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas
Chief Financial Officer
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REPORT OF INDEPENDENT ACCOUNTANTS
To the Board of Directors of the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas:
We  have examined management’s assertion that the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas (“FRB Dallas”)
maintained effective internal control over financial reporting and the safeguarding of assets as they
relate to the financial statements as of December 31, 2002, based on criteria described in “Internal
Control–Integrated Framework” issued by the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway
Commission included in the accompanying Management’s Assertion. Management of the FRB Dallas
is responsible for maintaining effective internal control over financial reporting and the safeguarding of
assets as they relate to the financial statements. Our responsibility is to express an opinion on the asser-
tion based on our examination.
Our examination was conducted in accordance with attestation standards established by the American
Institute of Certified Public Accountants, and accordingly, included obtaining an understanding of the
internal control over financial reporting, testing, and evaluating the design and operating effectiveness
of the internal control, and performing such other procedures as we considered necessary in the cir-
cumstances. We believe that our examination provides a reasonable basis for our opinion. 
Because of inherent limitations in any internal control, misstatements due to error or fraud may occur
and not be detected. Also, projections of any evaluation of the internal control over financial report-
ing to future periods are subject to the risk that the internal control may become inadequate because
of changes in conditions, or that the degree of compliance with the policies or procedures may dete-
riorate.
In our opinion, management’s assertion that the FRB Dallas maintained effective internal control over
financial reporting and over the safeguarding of assets as they relate to the financial statements as of
December 31, 2002, is fairly stated, in all material respects, based on criteria described in “Internal
Control–Integrated Framework” issued by the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Tread-
way Commission.
March 3, 2003
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REPORT OF INDEPENDENT ACCOUNTANTS
To the Board of Governors of The Federal Reserve System
and the Board of Directors of The Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas:
We have audited the accompanying statements of condition of The Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas
(the “Bank”) as of December 31, 2002 and 2001, and the related statements of income and changes
in capital for the years then ended, which have been prepared in conformity with the accounting
principles, policies, and practices established by the Board of Governors of The Federal Reserve 
System. These financial statements are the responsibility of the Bank’s management. Our respon-
sibility is to express an opinion on the financial statements based on our audits.
We conducted our audits in accordance with auditing standards generally accepted in the United States
of America. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain reasonable assurance
about whether the financial statements are free of material misstatement. An audit includes examin-
ing, on a test basis, evidence supporting the amounts and disclosures in the financial statements. An
audit also includes assessing the accounting principles used and significant estimates made by man-
agement, as well as evaluating the overall financial statement presentation. We believe that our audits
provide a reasonable basis for our opinion.
As discussed in Note 3, the financial statements were prepared in conformity with the accounting prin-
ciples, policies, and practices established by the Board of Governors of The Federal Reserve System.
These principles, policies, and practices, which were designed to meet the specialized accounting and
reporting needs of The Federal Reserve System, are set forth in the “Financial Accounting Manual for
Federal Reserve Banks” and constitute a comprehensive basis of accounting other than accounting prin-
ciples generally accepted in the United States of America.
In our opinion, the financial statements referred to above present fairly, in all material respects, the
financial position of the Bank as of December 31, 2002 and 2001, and results of its operations for the
years then ended, in conformity with the basis of accounting described in Note 3.
March 3, 2003
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Statements of Condition (in millions)
December 31, 2002 December 31, 2001
ASSETS
Gold certificates $ 485 $ 477
Special drawing rights certificates 98 98
Coin 163 128
Items in process of collection 624 202
U.S. government and federal agency securities, net 14,184 10,183
Investments denominated in foreign currencies 378 398
Accrued interest receivable 121 103
Interdistrict settlement account 14,306 4,041
Bank premises and equipment, net 166 164
Other assets 50 49
___________ ___________
Total assets $ 30,575 $ 15,843
___________ ___________ ___________ ___________
LIABILITIES AND CAPITAL
Liabilities
Federal Reserve notes outstanding, net $ 28,416 $ 14,378
Securities sold under agreements to repurchase 468 —
Deposits:
Depository institutions 727 695
Other deposits 4 3
Deferred credit items 505 350
Interest on Federal Reserve notes due U.S. Treasury 21 29
Accrued benefit costs 56 54
Other liabilities 6 6
___________ ___________
Total liabilities 30,203 15,515
___________ ___________
Capital
Capital paid-in 186 164
Surplus 186 164
___________ ___________
Total capital 372 328
___________ ___________
Total liabilities and capital $ 30,575 $ 15,843
___________ ___________ ___________ ___________
The accompanying notes are an integral part 
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Statements of Income (in millions)
FOR THE YEARS ENDED
December 31, 2002 December 31, 2001
INTEREST INCOME
Interest on U.S. government and federal agency securities $ 530 $ 637
Interest on investments denominated in foreign currencies 6 9 ___________ ___________
Total interest income 536 646
OTHER OPERATING INCOME
Income from services 63 64
Reimbursable services to government agencies 12 12
Foreign currency gains (losses), net 45 (40)
U.S. government securities gains, net 1 6
Other income 22 ___________ ___________
Total other operating income 123 44
OPERATING EXPENSES
Salaries and other benefits 98 96
Occupancy expense 15 14
Equipment expense 12 11
Assessments by Board of Governors 14 14
Other expenses 30 33 ___________ ___________
Total operating expenses 169 168
___________ ___________
Net income prior to distribution $ 490 $ 522
___________ ___________ ___________ ___________
DISTRIBUTION OF NET INCOME
Dividends paid to member banks $ 10 $ 10
Transferred to (from) surplus 22 (24)
Payments to U.S. Treasury as interest on Federal Reserve notes 458 536 ___________ ___________
Total distribution $ 490 $ 522
___________ ___________ ___________ ___________
The accompanying notes are an integral part 
of these financial statements.34 Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas ANNUAL REPORT 2002
Statements of Changes in Capital
for the Years Ended December 31, 2002,
and December 31, 2001 (in millions)
Capital Paid-In Surplus Total Capital
BALANCE AT JANUARY 1, 2001
(3.8 million shares) $ 188 $ 188 $ 376
Net income transferred from surplus — (24) (24)
Net change in capital stock redeemed
(0.5 million shares) (24) — (24)
________ ________ ________
BALANCE AT DECEMBER 31, 2001
(3.3 million shares) $ 164 $ 164 $ 328
Net income transferred to surplus — 22 22
Net change in capital stock issued
(0.4 million shares) 22 — 22
________ ________ ________
BALANCE AT DECEMBER 31, 2002
(3.7 million shares) $ 186 $ 186 $ 372
________ ________ ________ ________ ________ ________
The accompanying notes are an integral part 
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Notes to Financial Statements
1. STRUCTURE
The Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas (“Bank”) is part of the Federal Reserve System (“System”) cre-
ated by Congress under the Federal Reserve Act of 1913 (“Federal Reserve Act”) which established
the central bank of the United States. The System consists of the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System (“Board of Governors”) and twelve Federal Reserve Banks (“Reserve Banks”). The
Reserve Banks are chartered by the federal government and possess a unique set of governmental,
corporate, and central bank characteristics. The Bank and its branches in El Paso, Houston, and San
Antonio serve the Eleventh Federal Reserve District, which includes Texas and portions of Louisiana
and New Mexico. Other major elements of the System are the Federal Open Market Committee
(“FOMC”) and the Federal Advisory Council. The FOMC is composed of members of the Board of
Governors, the president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (“FRBNY”), and, on a rotating
basis, four other Reserve Bank presidents. Banks that are members of the System include all national
banks and any state chartered bank that applies and is approved for membership in the System.
Board of Directors
In accordance with the Federal Reserve Act, supervision and control of the Bank are exercised by a
Board of Directors. The Federal Reserve Act specifies the composition of the Board of Directors for
each of the Reserve Banks. Each board is composed of nine members serving three-year terms:
three directors, including those designated as Chairman and Deputy Chairman, are appointed by the
Board of Governors, and six directors are elected by member banks. Of the six elected by member
banks, three represent the public and three represent member banks. Member banks are divided
into three classes according to size. Member banks in each class elect one director representing
member banks and one representing the public. In any election of directors, each member bank
receives one vote, regardless of the number of shares of Reserve Bank stock it holds.
2. OPERATIONS AND SERVICES
The System performs a variety of services and operations. Functions include: formulating and con-
ducting monetary policy; participating actively in the payments mechanism, including large-dollar
transfers of funds, automated clearinghouse (“ACH”) operations and check processing; distributing
coin and currency; performing fiscal agency functions for the U.S. Treasury and certain federal agen-
cies; serving as the federal government’s bank; providing short-term loans to depository institutions;
serving the consumer and the community by providing educational materials and information
regarding consumer laws; supervising bank holding companies and state member banks; and
administering other regulations of the Board of Governors. The Board of Governors’ operating costs
are funded through assessments on the Reserve Banks.
The FOMC establishes policy regarding open market operations, oversees these operations, and
issues authorizations and directives to the FRBNY for its execution of transactions. Authorized trans-
action types include direct purchase and sale of securities, matched sale-purchase transactions,  the
purchase of securities under agreements to resell, the sale of securities under agreements to repur-
chase, and the lending of U.S. government securities. The FRBNY is also authorized by the FOMC to
hold balances of, and to execute spot and forward foreign exchange (“F/X”) and securities contracts
in, nine foreign currencies; maintain reciprocal currency arrangements (“F/X swaps”) with various
central banks; and “warehouse” foreign currencies for the U.S. Treasury and Exchange Stabilization
Fund (“ESF”) through the Reserve Banks.
3. SIGNIFICANT ACCOUNTING POLICIES
Accounting principles for entities with the unique powers and responsibilities of the nation’s central
bank have not been formulated by the Financial Accounting Standards Board. The Board of Gover-
nors has developed specialized accounting principles and practices that it believes are appropriate
for the significantly different nature and function of a central bank as compared to the private sec-
tor. These accounting principles and practices are documented in the Financial Accounting Manual
for Federal Reserve Banks (“Financial Accounting Manual”), which is issued by the Board of Gover-
nors. All Reserve Banks are required to adopt and apply accounting policies and practices that are
consistent with the Financial Accounting Manual.36 Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas ANNUAL REPORT 2002
The financial statements have been prepared in accordance with the Financial Accounting Manual.
Differences exist between the accounting principles and practices of the System and accounting
principles generally accepted in the United States of America (“GAAP”). The primary differences are
the presentation of all security holdings at amortized cost, rather than at the fair value presentation
requirements of GAAP, and the accounting for matched sale-purchase transactions as separate sales
and purchases, rather than secured borrowings with pledged collateral, as is generally required by
GAAP. In addition, the Bank has elected not to present a Statement of Cash Flows. The Statement of
Cash Flows has not been included as the liquidity and cash position of the Bank are not of primary
concern to the users of these financial statements. Other information regarding the Bank’s activities
is provided in, or may be derived from, the Statements of Condition, Income, and Changes in Cap-
ital. Therefore, a Statement of Cash Flows would not provide any additional useful information.
There are no other significant differences between the policies outlined in the Financial Accounting
Manual and GAAP.
Effective January 2001, the System implemented procedures to eliminate the sharing of costs by
Reserve Banks for certain services a Reserve Bank may provide on behalf of the System.  Major serv-
ices provided for the System by the Bank, for which the costs will not be redistributed to the other
Reserve Banks, include the Bulkdata Transmission Utility, Check Electronic Access and Delivery,
Check Standardization, Centralized Loans Automated System, National Examination Data System,
Desktop Standardization Initiative, and Lawson Central Business Administration Function.
The preparation of the financial statements in conformity with the Financial Accounting Manual
requires management to make certain estimates and assumptions that affect the reported amounts
of assets and liabilities, disclosure of contingent assets and liabilities at the date of the financial state-
ments, and the reported amounts of income and expenses during the reporting period. Actual
results could differ from those estimates. Certain amounts relating to prior year have been re-
classified to conform to the current-year presentation. Unique accounts and significant accounting
policies are explained below.
a. Gold Certificates
The Secretary of the Treasury is authorized to issue gold certificates to the Reserve Banks to mone-
tize gold held by the U.S. Treasury. Payment for the gold certificates by the Reserve Banks is made
by crediting equivalent amounts in dollars into the account established for the U.S. Treasury. These
gold certificates held by the Reserve Banks are required to be backed by the gold of the U.S. Treas-
ury. The U.S. Treasury may reacquire the gold certificates at any time and the Reserve Banks must
deliver them to the U.S. Treasury. At such time, the U.S. Treasury’s account is charged and the
Reserve Banks’ gold certificate accounts are lowered. The value of gold for purposes of backing the
gold certificates is set by law at $42 2/9 a fine troy ounce. The Board of Governors allocates the gold
certificates among Reserve Banks once a year based upon average Federal Reserve notes outstand-
ing in each District.
b. Special Drawing Rights Certificates
Special drawing rights (“SDRs”) are issued by the International Monetary Fund (“Fund”) to its mem-
bers in proportion to each member’s quota in the Fund at the time of issuance. SDRs serve as a sup-
plement to international monetary reserves and may be transferred from one national monetary
authority to another. Under the law providing for United States participation in the SDR system, the
Secretary of the U.S. Treasury is authorized to issue SDR certificates, somewhat like gold certificates,
to the Reserve Banks. At such time, equivalent amounts in dollars are credited to the account estab-
lished for the U.S. Treasury, and the Reserve Banks’ SDR certificate accounts are increased. The
Reserve Banks are required to purchase SDRs, at the direction of the U.S. Treasury, for the purpose
of financing SDR certificate acquisitions or for financing exchange stabilization operations. At the
time SDR transactions occur, the Board of Governors allocates SDR certificate transactions among
Reserve Banks based upon Federal Reserve notes outstanding in each District at the end of the pre-
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c. Loans to Depository Institutions
The Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 provides that all depos-
itory institutions that maintain reservable transaction accounts or nonpersonal time deposits, as
defined in Regulation D issued by the Board of Governors, have borrowing privileges at the discre-
tion of the Reserve Banks. Borrowers execute certain lending agreements and deposit sufficient col-
lateral before credit is extended. Loans are evaluated for collectibility. If loans were ever deemed to
be uncollectible, an appropriate reserve would be established. Interest is accrued using the applica-
ble discount rate established at least every fourteen days by the Boards of Directors of the Reserve
Banks, subject to review by the Board of Governors. Reserve Banks retain the option to impose a
surcharge above the basic rate in certain circumstances. There were no outstanding loans to depos-
itory institutions at December 31, 2002 or 2001.
d. U.S. Government and Federal Agency Securities and Investments Denominated in Foreign Currencies
The FOMC has designated the FRBNY to execute open market transactions on its behalf and to hold
the resulting securities in the portfolio known as the System Open Market Account (“SOMA”). In
addition to authorizing and directing operations in the domestic securities market, the FOMC
authorizes and directs the FRBNY to execute operations in foreign markets for major currencies in
order to counter disorderly conditions in exchange markets or to meet other needs specified by the
FOMC in carrying out the System’s central bank responsibilities. Such authorizations are reviewed
and approved annually by the FOMC.
In December 2002, the FRBNY replaced matched sale-purchase (“MSP”) transactions with securities
sold under agreements to repurchase. MSP transactions, accounted for as separate sale and pur-
chase transactions, are transactions in which the FRBNY sells a security and buys it back at the rate
specified at the commencement of the transaction. Securities sold under agreements to repurchase
are treated as secured borrowing transactions with the associated interest expense recognized over
the life of the transaction.
The FRBNY has sole authorization by the FOMC to lend U.S. government securities held in the
SOMA to U.S. government securities dealers and to banks participating in U.S. government securi-
ties clearing arrangements on behalf of the System, in order to facilitate the effective functioning of
the domestic securities market. These securities-lending transactions are fully collateralized by other
U.S. government securities. FOMC policy requires FRBNY to take possession of collateral in excess
of the market values of the securities loaned. The market values of the collateral and the securities
loaned are monitored by FRBNY on a daily basis, with additional collateral obtained as necessary.
The securities loaned continue to be accounted for in the SOMA. 
F/X contracts are contractual agreements between two parties to exchange specified currencies, at
a specified price, on a specified date. Spot foreign contracts normally settle two days after the trade
date, whereas the settlement date on forward contracts is negotiated between the contracting 
parties, but will extend beyond two days from the trade date. The FRBNY generally enters into spot
contracts, with any forward contracts generally limited to the second leg of a swap/warehousing
transaction.
The FRBNY, on behalf of the Reserve Banks, maintains renewable, short-term F/X swap arrange-
ments with two authorized foreign central banks. The parties agree to exchange their currencies up
to a pre-arranged maximum amount and for an agreed upon period of time (up to twelve months),
at an agreed upon interest rate. These arrangements give the FOMC temporary access to foreign 
currencies that it may need for intervention operations to support the dollar and give the partner
foreign central bank temporary access to dollars it may need to support its own currency. Drawings
under the F/X swap arrangements can be initiated by either the FRBNY or the partner foreign central
bank, and must be agreed to by the drawee. The F/X swaps are structured so that the party initiating
the transaction (the drawer) bears the exchange rate risk upon maturity. The FRBNY will generally
invest the foreign currency received under an F/X swap in interest-bearing instruments.
Warehousing is an arrangement under which the FOMC agrees to exchange, at the request of the
Treasury, U.S. dollars for foreign currencies held by the Treasury or ESF over a limited period of time.
The purpose of the warehousing facility is to supplement the U.S. dollar resources of the Treasury
and ESF for financing purchases of foreign currencies and related international operations. 38 Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas ANNUAL REPORT 2002
In connection with its foreign currency activities, the FRBNY, on behalf of the Reserve Banks, may
enter into contracts which contain varying degrees of off-balance sheet market risk, because they
represent contractual commitments involving future settlement and counter-party credit risk. The
FRBNY controls credit risk by obtaining credit approvals, establishing transaction limits, and per-
forming daily monitoring procedures.
While the application of current market prices to the securities currently held in the SOMA portfolio
and investments denominated in foreign currencies may result in values substantially above or
below their carrying values, these unrealized changes in value would have no direct effect on the
quantity of reserves available to the banking system or on the prospects for future Reserve Bank
earnings or capital. Both the domestic and foreign components of the SOMA portfolio from time to
time involve transactions that can result in gains or losses when holdings are sold prior to maturity.
Decisions regarding the securities and foreign currencies transactions, including their purchase and
sale, are motivated by monetary policy objectives rather than profit. Accordingly, market values,
earnings, and any gains or losses resulting from the sale of such currencies and securities are inci-
dental to the open market operations and do not motivate its activities or policy decisions. 
U.S. government and federal agency securities and investments denominated in foreign currencies
comprising the SOMA are recorded at cost, on a settlement-date basis, and adjusted for amortiza-
tion of premiums or accretion of discounts on a straight-line basis. Interest income is accrued on a
straight-line basis and is reported as “Interest on U.S. government and federal agency securities” or
“Interest on investments denominated in foreign currencies,” as appropriate. Income earned on
securities lending transactions is reported as a component of “Other income.” Gains and losses
resulting from sales of securities are determined by specific issues based on average cost. Gains and
losses on the sales of U.S. government and federal agency securities are reported as “U.S. govern-
ment securities gains, net.” Foreign currency-denominated assets are revalued daily at current foreign
currency market exchange rates in order to report these assets in U.S. dollars. Realized and unrealized
gains and losses on investments denominated in foreign currencies are reported as “Foreign currency
gains (losses), net.” Foreign currencies held through F/X swaps, when initiated by the counter-party,
and warehousing arrangements are revalued daily, with the unrealized gain or loss reported by the
FRBNY as a component of “Other assets” or “Other liabilities,” as appropriate.
Balances of U.S. government and federal agency securities bought outright, securities sold under
agreements to repurchase, securities loaned, investments denominated in foreign currencies, interest
income and expense, securities lending fee income, amortization of premiums and discounts on
securities bought outright, gains and losses on sales of securities, and realized and unrealized gains
and losses on investments denominated in foreign currencies, excluding those held under an F/X
swap arrangement, are allocated to each Reserve Bank. Income from securities lending transactions
undertaken by the FRBNY are also allocated to each Reserve Bank. Securities purchased under
agreements to resell and unrealized gains and losses on the revaluation of foreign currency holdings
under F/X swaps and warehousing arrangements are allocated to the FRBNY and not to other
Reserve Banks. 
e. Bank Premises, Equipment, and Software
Bank premises and equipment are stated at cost less accumulated depreciation. Depreciation is cal-
culated on a straight-line basis over estimated useful lives of assets ranging from 2 to 50 years. New
assets, major alterations, renovations, and improvements are capitalized at cost as additions to the
asset accounts. Maintenance, repairs, and minor replacements are charged to operations in the year
incurred. Costs incurred for software, either developed internally or acquired for internal use, during
the application development stage are capitalized based on the cost of direct services and materials
associated with designing, coding, installing, or testing software. 
f. Interdistrict Settlement Account
At the close of business each day, all Reserve Banks and branches assemble the payments due to or
from other Reserve Banks and branches as a result of transactions involving accounts residing in
other Districts that occurred during the day’s operations. Such transactions may include funds settle-
ment, check clearing and ACH operations, and allocations of shared expenses. The cumulative net
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g. Federal Reserve Notes
Federal Reserve notes are the circulating currency of the United States. These notes are issued
through the various Federal Reserve agents (the Chairman of the Board of Directors of each Reserve
Bank) to the Reserve Banks upon deposit with such agents of certain classes of collateral security,
typically U.S. government securities. These notes are identified as issued to a specific Reserve Bank.
The Federal Reserve Act provides that the collateral security tendered by the Reserve Bank to the
Federal Reserve agent must be equal to the sum of the notes applied for by such Reserve Bank. In
accordance with the Federal Reserve Act, gold certificates, special drawing rights certificates, U.S.
government and federal agency securities, securities purchased under agreements to resell, loans to
depository institutions, and investments denominated in foreign currencies are pledged as collateral
for net Federal Reserve notes outstanding. The collateral value is equal to the book value of the 
collateral tendered, with the exception of securities, whose collateral value is equal to the par value
of the securities tendered, and securities purchased under agreements to resell, which are valued at
the contract amount. The par value of securities pledged for securities sold under agreements to
repurchase is similarly deducted. The Board of Governors may, at any time, call upon a Reserve Bank
for additional security to adequately collateralize the Federal Reserve notes. The Reserve Banks have
entered into an agreement that provides for certain assets of the Reserve Banks to be jointly pledged
as collateral for the Federal Reserve notes of all Reserve Banks in order to satisfy their obligation of
providing sufficient collateral for outstanding Federal Reserve notes. In the event that this collateral
is insufficient, the Federal Reserve Act provides that Federal Reserve notes become a first and para-
mount lien on all the assets of the Reserve Banks. Finally, as obligations of the United States, 
Federal Reserve notes are backed by the full faith and credit of the United States government. 
The “Federal Reserve notes outstanding, net” account represents the Bank’s Federal Reserve notes
outstanding, reduced by its currency holdings of $8,424 million, and $19,062 million at December
31, 2002 and 2001, respectively. 
h. Capital Paid-in
The Federal Reserve Act requires that each member bank subscribe to the capital stock of the
Reserve Bank in an amount equal to 6 percent of the capital and surplus of the member bank. As a
member bank’s capital and surplus changes, its holdings of the Reserve Bank’s stock must be
adjusted. Member banks are those state-chartered banks that apply and are approved for member-
ship in the System and all national banks. Currently, only one-half of the subscription is paid-in and
the remainder is subject to call. These shares are nonvoting with a par value of $100. They may not
be transferred or hypothecated. By law, each member bank is entitled to receive an annual dividend
of 6 percent on the paid-in capital stock. This cumulative dividend is paid semiannually. A member
bank is liable for Reserve Bank liabilities up to twice the par value of stock subscribed by it.
i. Surplus
The Board of Governors requires Reserve Banks to maintain a surplus equal to the amount of capital
paid-in as of December 31. This amount is intended to provide additional capital and reduce the possi-
bility that the Reserve Banks would be required to call on member banks for additional capital. 
Pursuant to Section 16 of the Federal Reserve Act, Reserve Banks are required by the Board of 
Governors to transfer to the U.S. Treasury excess earnings, after providing for the costs of operations,
payment of dividends, and reservation of an amount necessary to equate surplus with capital paid-in.
In the event of losses or a substantial increase in capital, payments to the U.S. Treasury are suspended
until such losses are recovered through subsequent earnings. Weekly payments to the U.S. Treasury
may vary significantly. 
j. Income and Costs related to Treasury Services
The Bank is required by the Federal Reserve Act to serve as fiscal agent and depository of the United
States. By statute, the Department of the Treasury is permitted, but not required, to pay for these
services. 
k. Taxes
The Reserve Banks are exempt from federal, state, and local taxes, except for taxes on real property,
which are reported as a component of “Occupancy expense.”40 Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas ANNUAL REPORT 2002
4. U.S. GOVERNMENT AND FEDERAL AGENCY SECURITIES
Securities bought outright are held in the SOMA at the FRBNY. An undivided interest in SOMA activ-
ity and the related premiums, discounts, and income, with the exception of securities purchased
under agreements to resell, is allocated to each Reserve Bank on a percentage basis derived from
an annual settlement of interdistrict clearings. The settlement, performed in April of each year,
equalizes Reserve Bank gold certificate holdings to Federal Reserve notes outstanding. The Bank’s
allocated share of SOMA balances was approximately 2.219 percent and 1.813 percent at Decem-
ber 31, 2002 and 2001, respectively.
The Bank’s allocated share of securities held in the SOMA at December 31, that were bought out-




Bills $ 5,031 3,301
Notes 6,611 4,821
Bonds 2,326 1,879
Total par value 13,968 10,001
Unamortized premiums 239 205
Unaccreted discounts (23) (23)
Total allocated to Bank $14,184 $10,183
Total SOMA securities bought outright were $639,125 million and $561,701 million at December 31,
2002 and 2001, respectively.
The maturity distribution of U.S. government and federal agency securities bought outright, which
were allocated to the Bank at December 31, 2002, was as follows (in millions):
Par value
U.S. Government Federal Agency
Maturities of Securities Held Securities Obligations Total
Within 15 days $ 609 $ — $ 609
16 days to 90 days 3,422 — 3,422
91 days to 1 year 3,148 — 3,148
Over 1 year to 5 years 3,834 — 3,834
Over 5 years to 10 years 1,183 — 1,183
Over 10 years 1,772 — 1,772
Total $ 13,968 $ — $ 13,968
As mentioned in footnote 3, in December 2002, the FRBNY replaced MSP transactions with securi-
ties sold under agreements to repurchase. At December 31, 2002, securities sold under agreements
to repurchase with a contract amount of $21,091 million and a par value of $21,098 million were
outstanding, of which $468 million each were allocated to the Bank. At December 31, 2001, MSP
transactions involving U.S. government securities with a par value of $23,188 million were out-
standing, of which $420 million was allocated to the Bank. Securities sold under agreements to
repurchase and MSP transactions are generally overnight arrangements.
At December 31, 2002 and 2001, U.S. government securities with par values of $1,841 million and
$7,345 million, respectively, were loaned from the SOMA, of which $41 million and $133 million
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5. INVESTMENTS DENOMINATED IN FOREIGN CURRENCIES
The FRBNY, on behalf of the Reserve Banks, holds foreign currency deposits with foreign central
banks and the Bank for International Settlements, and invests in foreign government debt instru-
ments. Foreign government debt instruments held include both securities bought outright and 
securities purchased under agreements to resell. These investments are guaranteed as to principal
and interest by the foreign governments. 
Each Reserve Bank is allocated a share of foreign-currency-denominated assets, the related interest
income, and realized and unrealized foreign currency gains and losses, with the exception of unreal-
ized gains and losses on F/X swaps and warehousing transactions. This allocation is based on the
ratio of each Reserve Bank’s capital and surplus to aggregate capital and surplus at the preceding
December 31. The Bank’s allocated share of investments denominated in foreign currencies was
approximately 2.234 percent and 2.731 percent at December 31, 2002 and 2001, respectively. 
The Bank’s allocated share of investments denominated in foreign currencies, valued at current for-
eign currency market exchange rates at December 31, was as follows (in millions):
2002 2001
European Union euro:
Foreign currency deposits $124 $125
Government debt instruments including agreements to resell 74 74
Japanese yen:
Foreign currency deposits 40 52
Government debt instruments including agreements to resell 138 145
Accrued interest 2 2
Total $378 $398
Total investments denominated in foreign currencies were $16,913 million and $14,559 million at
December 31, 2002 and 2001, respectively. 
The maturity distribution of investments denominated in foreign currencies that were allocated to
the Bank at December 31, 2002, was as follows (in millions):
Maturities of Investments Denominated in Foreign Currencies
Within 1 year $ 349
Over 1 year to 5 years 20
Over 5 years to 10 years 9
Over 10 years —
Total$ 378
At December 31, 2002 and 2001, there were no open foreign exchange contracts or outstanding F/X
swaps.
At December 31, 2002 and 2001, the warehousing facility was $5,000 million, with zero balance
outstanding.
6. BANK PREMISES AND EQUIPMENT
A summary of bank premises and equipment at December 31 is as follows (in millions):
2002 2001
Bank premises and equipment:
Land $ 30 $ 30
Buildings 115 115
Building machinery and equipment 24 24
Construction in progress 11 3
Furniture and equipment 68 76
248 248
Accumulated depreciation (82) (84)
Bank premises and equipment, net $166 $16442 Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas ANNUAL REPORT 2002
Depreciation expense was $10 million for each of the years ended December 31, 2002 and 2001.
Approximately $7 million of architectural fees and other costs associated with the construction of a
new building in Houston are included in Construction in progress.
7. COMMITMENTS AND CONTINGENCIES
At December 31, 2002, the Bank was obligated under noncancelable leases for premises and equip-
ment with terms ranging from one to approximately five years. These leases provide for increased
rentals based upon increases in real estate taxes, operating costs, or selected price indices.
Rental expense under operating leases for certain operating facilities, warehouses, and data pro-
cessing and office equipment (including taxes, insurance, and maintenance when included in rent),
net of sublease rentals, was $2 million for each of the years ended December 31, 2002 and 2001.
Certain of the Bank’s leases have options to renew. 
Future minimum rental payments under noncancelable operating leases, net of sublease rentals,









In 2002, the Bank entered into a $10 million long-term contract for services relating to a new Hous-
ton building, of which approximately $4 million had been paid by December 31, 2002. The remain-
ing commitment of $6 million has not been recognized as a liability in the financial statements.
Under the Insurance Agreement of the Federal Reserve Banks dated as of March 2, 1999, each of
the Reserve Banks has agreed to bear, on a per incident basis, a pro rata share of losses in excess of 
one percent of the capital paid-in of the claiming Reserve Bank, up to 50 percent of the total capital
paid-in of all Reserve Banks. Losses are borne in the ratio that a Reserve Bank’s capital paid-in bears
to the total capital paid-in of all Reserve Banks at the beginning of the calendar year in which the
loss is shared. No claims were outstanding under such agreement at December 31, 2002 or 2001.
The Bank is involved in certain legal actions and claims arising in the ordinary course of business.
Although it is difficult to predict the ultimate outcome of these actions, in management’s opinion,
based on discussions with counsel, the aforementioned litigation and claims will be resolved with-
out material adverse effect on the financial position or results of operations of the Bank.
8. RETIREMENT AND THRIFT PLANS
Retirement Plans
The Bank currently offers two defined benefit retirement plans to its employees, based on length of
service and level of compensation. Substantially all of the Bank’s employees participate in the Retire-
ment Plan for Employees of the Federal Reserve System (“System Plan”) and the Benefit Equaliza-
tion Retirement Plan (“BEP”), and certain Bank officers participate in a Supplemental Employee
Retirement Plan (“SERP”). The System Plan is a multi-employer plan with contributions fully funded
by participating employers. No separate accounting is maintained of assets contributed by the par-
ticipating employers. The Bank’s projected benefit obligation and net pension costs for the BEP at
December 31, 2002 and 2001, and for the SERP at December 31, 2002, and for the years then
ended, are not material.
Thrift Plan
Employees of the Bank may also participate in the defined contribution Thrift Plan for Employees
of the Federal Reserve System (“Thrift Plan”). The Bank’s Thrift Plan contributions totaled $4 mil-
lion and $3 million for the years ended December 31, 2002 and 2001, respectively, and are reported
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9. POSTRETIREMENT BENEFITS OTHER THAN PENSIONS AND POSTEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS
Postretirement Benefits Other Than Pensions
In addition to the Bank’s retirement plans, employees who have met certain age and length of service
requirements are eligible for both medical benefits and life insurance coverage during retirement.
The Bank funds benefits payable under the medical and life insurance plans as due and, accordingly,
has no plan assets. Net postretirement benefit costs are actuarially determined using a January 1
measurement date.
Following is a reconciliation of beginning and ending balances of the benefit obligation (in millions):
2002 2001
Accumulated postretirement 
benefit obligation at January 1 $ 41.5 $ 34.9
Service cost-benefits earned during the period 1.0 1.0
Interest cost of accumulated benefit obligation 2.7 2.8
Actuarial loss (gain) (1.2) 6.2
Contributions by plan participants 0.4 0.3
Benefits paid (1.9) (1.7)
Plan amendments (curtailments, special termination benefits) 0.5 (2.0)
Accumulated postretirement 
benefit obligation at December 31 $ 43.0 $ 41.5
Following is a reconciliation of the beginning and ending balance of the plan assets, the unfunded
postretirement benefit obligation, and the accrued postretirement benefit cost (in millions):
2002 2001
Fair value of plan assets at January 1 $ — $ —
Actual return on plan assets — —
Contributions by the employer 1.5 1.4
Contributions by plan participants 0.4 0.3
Benefits paid (1.9) (1.7)
Fair value of plan assets at December 31 $ — $ —
Unfunded postretirement benefit obligation $ 43.0 $ 41.5
Unrecognized initial net transition asset (obligation) — —
Unrecognized prior service cost 13.6 15.3
Unrecognized net actuarial loss (7.9) (9.2)
Accrued postretirement benefit costs $ 48.7 $ 47.6
Accrued postretirement benefit costs are reported as a component of “Accrued benefit costs.”
At December 31, 2002 and 2001, the weighted-average discount rate assumptions used in develop-
ing the benefit obligation were 6.75 percent and 7.0 percent, respectively.
For measurement purposes, a 9.0 percent annual rate of increase in the cost of covered health care
benefits was assumed for 2003. Ultimately, the health care cost trend rate is expected to decrease
gradually to 5.0 percent by 2008, and remain at that level thereafter. 44 Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas ANNUAL REPORT 2002
Assumed health care cost trend rates have a significant effect on the amounts reported for health
care plans. A one percentage point change in assumed health care cost trend rates would have the
following effects for the year ended December 31, 2002 (in millions):
One Percentage One Percentage
Point Increase Point Decrease
Effect on aggregate of service and interest 
cost components of net periodic 
postretirement benefit costs $ 0.1 $ (0.2)
Effect on accumulated postretirement benefit obligation 1.4 (1.8)
The following is a summary of the components of net periodic postretirement benefit costs for the
years ended December 31 (in millions):
2002 2001
Service cost-benefits earned during the period $ 1.0 $ 1.0
Interest cost of accumulated benefit obligation 2.7 2.8
Amortization of prior service cost (1.2) (1.0)
Recognized net actuarial loss 0.1 0.1
Net periodic postretirement benefit costs $ 2.6 $ 2.9
Net periodic postretirement benefit costs are reported as a component of “Salaries and other
benefits.”
Postemployment Benefits
The Bank offers benefits to former or inactive employees. Postemployment benefit costs are 
actuarially determined and include the cost of medical and dental insurance, survivor income, and
disability benefits. Costs were projected using the same discount rate and health care trend rates as
were used for projecting postretirement costs. The accrued postemployment benefit costs recog-
nized by the Bank at December 31, 2002 and 2001, were $7 million and $6 million, respectively.
This cost is included as a component of “Accrued benefit costs.” Net periodic postemployment bene-
fit costs included in 2002 and 2001 operating expenses were $2 million and $1 million, respectively.
10.SUBSEQUENT EVENT
In January 2003, the System announced plans to restructure its check collection operations. The
restructuring plans include streamlining the check management structure, reducing staff, decreas-
ing the number of check-processing locations, and increasing processing capacity in other locations.
The restructuring, which is expected to begin in 2003 and conclude by the end of 2004, will result
in the Bank discontinuing its check operations at the El Paso and San Antonio offices, increasing its
check processing capacity at the Dallas office, and consolidating its check adjustment function at the
Houston office. At this time, the Reserve Banks have not developed detailed estimates of the cost of
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Volume of Operations 
(UNAUDITED)
Number of Items Handled Dollar Amount 
(Thousands) (Millions)
2002 2001 2002 2001
SERVICES TO DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS
CASH SERVICES
Federal Reserve notes processed 2,575,034 2,394,863 41,295 37,720
Currency received from circulation 2,569,936 2,448,543 41,108 38,533
Coin received from circulation 812,381 1,383,392 113 173
CHECK PROCESSING
Commercial–processed 1,312,897 1,321,166 845,267 818,354
Commercial–fine sorted 66,444 81,087 133,982 92,803
LOANS
Advances made 280* 202* 785 350
SERVICES TO THE U.S. TREASURY
AND GOVERNMENT AGENCIES
Issues and reinvestments 
of Treasury securities 67 70 2,635 2,535
*Individual loans, not in thousands.46 Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas ANNUAL REPORT 2002
The firm engaged by the Board of Governors for the audits of the individual and combined financial
statements of the Reserve Banks for 2002 was PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP (PwC). Fees for these
services totaled $1.0 million. In order to ensure auditor independence, the Board of Governors
requires that PwC be independent in all matters relating to the audit. Specifically, PwC may not per-
form services for the Reserve Banks or others that would place it in a position of auditing its own
work, making management decisions on behalf of the Reserve Banks, or in any other way impair-
ing its audit independence. In 2002, the Bank did not engage PwC for advisory services.About the Dallas Fed
The Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas is one of 
12 regional Federal Reserve Banks in the United
States. Together with the Board of Governors in
Washington, D.C., these organizations form the 
Federal Reserve System and function as the nation’s
central bank. The System’s basic purpose is to 
provide a flow of money and credit that will foster
orderly economic growth and a stable dollar. In 
addition, Federal Reserve Banks supervise banks 
and bank holding companies and provide certain
financial services to the banking industry, the 
federal government and the public. 
The Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas has served 
the financial institutions in the Eleventh District since
1914. The district encompasses 350,000 square
miles and comprises the state of Texas, northern
Louisiana and southern New Mexico. The three
branch offices of the Dallas Fed are in El Paso, 
Houston and San Antonio.
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